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
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DF 187-F

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REALES MADE BY MINISTERIALRAT FERRER IN REPLY TO CERTAIN QUESTIONS OF A GINERAL MATURE

1. During his period of dstention (September-December 1946) at the Hq 7707 European Command Intelligence Center, Obsrurzel, Germany, Wilhelm FERMER, former Ministerialrat and chief of cryptanalysis in the Armed Forces High Command Cryptologic Agency (OKN/Chi), wrote a lengthy report concerning his past career and his extensive experiences in the field of cryptology. This report was never issued in translation although an inadequate summary by Army Security Agency was issued as TICOM/I-206.

2. The present DF 187 Series will constitute, when completed, a translation of FERNER's entire written report. The attached is the seventh and penultimate of the series and contains FERNER's remarks made in reply to certain questions of a general nature. Because the questions cover a wide range of topics without specific relation to one another, no attempt has been made, as in previous isomes of FERNER's answers, to make of the report an integrated whole. Within this report the questions with their answers have been included as separate and distinct items, although some thought has been given to their logical arrangement. Pertinent notes from the TICOM files and from the memory of one of FERNER's original interrogators, MARY C. LAME, Capt. WAC, have been added.

- 3. Provious TICOM reports of this sories are:
 - DF 187 The Career of Wilhelm FEENER with Special Regard to his Activity in the Field of Cryptography and Cryptanalysis
 - DF 187-A Organization of the Cryptologic Agency of the Armod Forces High Cormany, with Nemes, Activities, and Number of Employees Mogether with a Description of the Devices Used
 - DF 187-B The Cryptanalytic Succession of CEW/Chi after 1938
 - DF 187-C Relations of OKW/Chi with Other German Cryptologic Bureaus
 - DF 187-D Relations of OKW/Chi with Follogic Bureaus
 - DF 187-E Comments by MERNER on the Answerien Cryptologic Eureau and Former German Colleagues

P-SECRE-T-MAN

35 copies

53 pages

August 1950

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REMARKS MADE BY FORMER MINISTERIALRAT FENNER IN REPLY TO CERTAIN QUESTIONS OF A GENERAL NATURE

1. What have you done from May 1945 to the time of your arrest? Have you been in contact with your former associates? If so, how have you been in contact with them? Do you know what has become of any of your former associates? How did you learn such details?

In May 1945 I was in Werfen where the railway train with the remnants of Chi was standing at the station. My activity consisted in eating, drinking, taking a walk, chatting with my people. As far as my people knew foreign languages they were assigned as interpreters because there wan a great deal te do. Since at that time there were occasional wild rumors about the setting up under American commend of German units to fight against Bolshevion, I twice contacted the adjutant of Comhat Group Bork (at the time that was the tactical unit to which we were subordinated), in order to suggest in such case the advisability of taking over all my people as a group. Furthermore some of my people asked me for a letter of reference. I wrote one for MENZER.¹.

Toward the end of May the remnant of Chi was transferred by the Americans to Heufeld in Upper Bavaria. I spent my time there by writing letters of reference for all former members of my unit who were then present; <u>Ministerialrat</u> Dr. WENDLAND² and <u>Regierungerat</u> Dr. WEISSER³ assisted me in this. Early in June I was transferred to the "<u>Fushrerreserve</u>", i. e., after the release of civilians there now began the successive release of officers and officiale with officer rating according to a plan approved by the Americans. I went to Bruckmuchl on the Mangfall (Upper Bavaria) and was obliged to wait without any activity until I should be taken away to a prisen camp. That happened about 18 June 1945. With most of my comrades I came to Landshut. Originally

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- 2. Interrogated hy TICOM in 1947. See TICOM/I-202.
- 3. Interrogated by TICOM in 1947. See TICOM/T#201.

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I wanted to go home to the Ruseian Zone of Occupation, to Hangeleberg on the Spree where I had left my wife, but American officere warned me against doing eo. I was therefore undecided as to what I ought to do. Then by chance I became acquainted in the camp with the new Landrat of Kreis Mallersdorf, Herr HARTENBACE, who wrote me a recommendation to the new Landrat of Kreie Straubing in Lover Havaria, Herr BICKLEDER. I was reloased on the 19th or 20th of June 1945 and went to Straubing where I arrived 21 Jane acd had a room assigned me by the housing office at the home of merchant VEIT, Hinderburgetrasse 18. The Landrat had no possibility of using me, however, although it was not my non-memborship in the NSDAP which was decisive but, as I was told, bocause I could not "be employed in the public service as a matter of principlo since I was a high official of the former German "Wehrmacht". Since I had money enough to get along for a few weeks I went for a walk. And as I walked I was in excellent spirits because during the entire war I had never had more than three days leave at a time. I also was hungry. Botween the beginning and middle of July 1945 I applied to Justizrat Dr. PRAGER for advice because my idlensee was gradually becoming diotasteful. PRAGER gave me a recommendation to the Regierungeprassident in Regensburg, Dr. FALKNER. I found him at the home of the architect, SCHMID. But when FALKWER heard that I had been in tho War Ministry and therefore automatically in OKN up to the time of my transfer to General der Aufklaerung Sued, 4 he declined to intercede for me on the grounde that they only had room for Havarians. I then went to the Labor Office and had to clean up a house at Pandurengasse which had been badly damaged by an air attack. Later I spent weeks saving and splitting wood on the same property; I picked out all sound beams and piled everything in order on the ruined site. Late in September I went to Heidelberg to try to reaction with the industrialist HANAEMANN whom I knew by name.

4. During the closing days of the war the German Army signal intelligence forces were divided into northern and southern groups. FERNER here states he was assigned to Army Signal Intelligence South. /Ed. Note/

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But HANNEMAHN was away and I returned to Straubing at enco. There I had meanwhile become acquainted with Max KNCEDL who ran an automobile repair and sales businees. He took a liking to me and suggested that I work in his workshop. I could not start at once, however, because there were two conditions which had to be fulfilled: I declined to work with Georg HESSLER who was the boss in the shop because he did not make a good impression on me and because he had been a Party member; also the Labor Office would have to asseign me to KNOEDL. So I continued sawing and chopping wood. As of 1 December 1945 I was assigned by the Labor Office to the KNOEDL Firm as helper and continued to work there as mechanic on bicycles and automobiles until the time of my arrest on the evening of 2 July 1946. I carried stones to build a house, helped dig a well, excavated for a foundation, and evenings took account of stock, prepared the weekly account showing receipts and expendituree, and made myself usoful about the premisee wherever necessary.

The question, with what members of the cryptologic organization I have been in contact since the war, is probably to be construed to mean, with what former members of Chi I have been in communication <u>after</u> the war was over. These persone are:

1. Fram lise SCHWAB,⁵ wife of Dr. Jur. Kurt SCHWAB. Fram SCHWAB worked for me in the Telegram Registry of Chi and during the last months before the evacuation of Berlin sometimes helped me in the necretariat. She came with me to Straubing, worked first as clerk at KNOEDL'e and then found a position at the airfield in Straubing, working for the Red Cross.

2. My nister Mathilde FERNER.⁶ I have written her two private letters; she may have written me three. You can learn her address through my sister Frau Dr Johanna MICHELSSON, Schoenberg, Kreie Calv in Wuerttemborg, French Zone.

5. See DF 187-A, p. 5, where Frau Ilse SCHWAB is entered as a member of the Section, Registry of Talegrams, Group a, Main Group B, CEN/Chi.

 See DF 187-A, p. 7, where Frl. Mathilde FENNER is entered as a member of Section 5 (France, Bolgium, Netherlande, Switzerland, Egypt), Group b, Main Group B, CKW/Chi.

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3. Herr MCRS, Britich Zone (address unknown to me)⁷ wrote me a card late in 1945 informing me that he had opened a translation buroau. I did not answer him.

4. Herr MENZER,⁸ apparently an automobile mechanic in Zschoppau, Sameny, Russian Zone, wrete me a postcard and told me that he was trying hard to become a compstant person in his new calling. I did not answer him,

5. Frl. Gertrud BAULE⁹ told me in the fall (7) of 1945 on a form postcard that she had either become engaged or married. I do not quite recall. I did not answer.

6. Herr SCHWELLBACH¹⁰ from Regensburg notified me on a printed card that he had married. I did not answer. His wife is the former employee OSTERODE, who last worked in the archives with Dr. SCHAEDEL. (I cmitted her name there because I did not recall her).¹¹

7. First Lieutenant Otto KUNZE¹² wrote me about the middle of April from a prisoner-of-war care in Garmisch-Partonkirchen that he was the only one who had not yet been released. I did not answer him.

- 7. See DF 187-A, p. 7, where Angestellter Robert MORS is entered as a member of Section 6 (England, USA), Group b, Main Group B.
- 8. See DF 187-A, p. 4, where Reg. Cherinep. Fritz MENZER is entered as a member of Group I, Main Group A.
- See DF 187-A, p. 8, where Frl. Gertrud BAULE is entered as a member of Section 11 (Greece), Group b, Main Group B.
- 10. See DF 187-A, p. 6, where Corvin SCHNELLES JH is entered as a radio operator in Section 4 (Italy), Group b, Main Group B.
- 11. See DF 187-A, p. 11, where it is stated that Dr. SCHAEDEL was assisted in the archives by "three fomale employees and one enlisted man".
- 12. See DF 18"

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8. Fr1. Irmgard KOEPP,¹³ now in Regeneburg, Reichepost, Military Directorate, twice visited my wife in Straubing. I exchanged a few words with her.

Those are my contacts with the former members of my old unit. From Frl. KOEPP I also heard that Colonel KETTLER¹⁴ is supposed to be active in an insurance agency and that HUETTENHAIN¹⁵ is supposed to be in London. What has become of the other people I do not know. It is possible that:

Freifrau von MEDEM is in Bad Aibling,¹⁶ Frl. Dr. BRUSSOW is in Weihenkirchen,¹⁷ Frau BENNINGHOVEN is in Weihenkirchen,¹⁸ Dr. Franz WEISSER is in Bruckmushl,¹⁹

All these places are in Upper Bavaria.

- 13. See DF 187-A, p. 7, where Frl. Irmgard KOEPP is entered as n member of Section 6 (England, USA), Group b, Main Group B.
- 14. Chief of OKW/Chi in 1944 (DF 187-A, p. 3). Compare DETIMANN's statement (DF 185, Part II, p. 110) that KETTLER had been Director of an Information Office in Hamburg, but since 12 August 1947 was director of a bureau in Munich (Address: Muenchen, Isabellastr. 29 b/Opitz). MENZER states that he addressed a letter to KETTLER at this addresse (DF 174, p. 14) but received no answer.
- 15. See DF 187-A, p. 11, where HUETTENHAIN is entered as head with FENNER and WENDLAND of Section 4 (Training and Instruction), Group C, Main Group B. See DF 185, Part I, p. 98, note 1 for references to HUETTENHAIN in TICCM interrogation reports.
- 16. See DF 187-A, p. 5, where Freifrau Edith v. MEDEM is entered as a member of the Section Registry of Telegrams, Group a, Main Group B.
- 17. See DF 187-A, p. 7, where Frl. Dr. Margarethe BRUSSOW is entered as a member of Section 6 (England, USA), Group b, Main Group B.
- 18. See DF 187-A, p. 7, where Frau Aune BENNINGHOVEN is entered as a member of Section 6 (England, USA), Group b, Main Group B.
- 19. See DF 187-A, p. 7, where RR Dr. Franz WEISSER is entered as a member of Section 6 (England, USA), Group a, Main Group B. See nleo TICCM/I-201 "Interrogation of The Phil. Studienaseeseer of Anglo-American States that he was in Bruckmuchl as private tutor from June 1945 to 1 May 1946 when he went to Augeburg as teacher of Latin, German and French in the Oberschule at Augeburg. WEISSER's daughter (ill with tuberculosis) remained in Bruckmuchl.

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2. Give an account of the history and organization of Reichswahrministerium Cryptologic Bureau; personalities in it. What continuity wan there with the 1918 organization? When did the German Defense Ministry (Reichswehrministerium) become the German War Ministry (Reichskriegsministorium) and what was the difference between the two organizations?

In the First World War there was no cryptologic hureau. Cryptanalysis was carried on at Grand Enadquarters, in some Armins, and also with a Bavarian Army Corps. The Cryptologic Bureau of the German Ministry of Defense (<u>Reichswehrministerium</u>) was founded in 1921. Its epiritual founder was First Lieutenant BUSCHENHAGEN who had been for a time during the war liaison officer stationed with the Austrian cryptanalytic unit in Bozen (Tyrol). BUSCHENHAGEN organized a small new cryptanalytic section and had among his personnel two employees who had down such work during the World War. These were the employees Helimut MUELLER and Nikolai ROHEN, who later became officials in the Cryptologic Agency of the German Armed Forces (OEM/Chi). All the othor personnel were new.

During some onn of the fraquent Communist disturbances, BUSCHENHAGEN succended in rescuing from bundles of documents which had benn partially plundmrnd about 100 rmports of the former cryptanalytic unit. These were mostly reports from Enadquarters and from the Bavarian cryptanalytic unit. This material I worked through and put in order when I was trying to ascertain what kind of cryptographic systems had been used and solved during the First World War.²⁰ From these reports I later prepared some 55 documents each about five centimeters thick. When we had to count on Barlin's being directly endangered, this material was taken to Junterbog to the artillary barracks and was nither destroyed there or fell into the hands of the Russians. During the last months other transfers of ald documents were made which were withdrawn from my control because I had nothing to do with them. Therefore it is possible that this material wer?

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^{20.} This is the material to which reference is made in the history of the Cryptologic Agency which is probably to be attributed to FERNER: "In the spring of 1919, supposedly over the protests of Red contemporaries, hn (BUSCHENHAGEN) succeeded in reacuing from the mass of documents of the Chinf Signal Officer what turned out to be extremely valuable basic materials - primarily cryptanalytic reports, the study of which contributed in later years to the recovery without great expenditure of energy of forgottom experience". (DF 202, p. 6).

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I believe thn German Defense Minietry (Reichswehrminieterium) became the German War Ministry (Reichskriegsministerium) after the introduction of universal military esrvice. The exact day I do not know. In almost any old German pocknt calendar, however, you will find on one of the last pages a number of notes on "Nationally Noteworthy Days." The exact date can be looked up there without difficulty. The U.S. Mar Department doubtlesely has a collection of German laws. In the "Allgnmeinen Heeresmitteilungen" the change of name must surely have been given and, of course, in the daily press. The change of name was made nither by a decree of the cabinet or perhaps by an order of HITLER. In reality, the change of name was absolutely ineignificant; it merely meant printing new letterheade, but in popular parlance the new Army (Reichshenr) continued to hn callnd the "Rnichswehr" despite its new name. In the language of the politicians the word "Wehr", taken critically, meant naturally merely doffenen while the word "Kring" naturally contains the two conceptn: definion and attack. How unimportant such designations are is shown by thn fact that other countrine likewise havn called their Ministry of War a Ministry for National Defense without having any idea of indicating thereby that the country, as a matter of principle, in thinking only of defence. However, internal political considerations turn the scale in the choice of such official dusignations. Mornover, it is imposeible to set up the claim that a country which calle ite highest political authority a Ministry of War is mernly on that account thinking aggressivoly. A modern example of this is France where the great mass of the population before this war was thinking dnfeneively, indend so defensively that nonn the military literature of their own country was occupind with this theme.

Butween these two organizations there was no diffurence. 3. Did the NSDAP exert any direct or indirect measures on our fahi?

The Party, purely as a Party organization, naturally did not control OKW/Chi at any time. For this purpose they took other courses and employed other means. And this control was never directed against Chi as such but only against certain exponents. The controlling organ may always have been the computent Gestapo office or the Security Service (Sicherheitsdinnst - SD)

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insofar as GOERING's "Research Bureau" (the Forechungsamt - FA) did not have a finger in the pie.

The following cases are known to me.

About April 1934, pessibly even earlier, there was a check by the Forschungsamt on the gentlemen in the German War Ministry by meane of telephone tapping. An eaveedropped telephone conversation of REICHEMAU, at that time <u>Chef dee Ministerants</u> was direct occasion for the suicide of SCHIMPF. When Chi in respect to the cost of representation was etill Group II of the <u>Abwehr</u> (while in respect to personnel and equipment it was suberdinate to the Army Signal Branch (<u>Inepektion der Hachrichtentruppen</u>) under FELIGIEBEL)) the <u>Forschungsamt</u> had fitted out the desk telephone standing in the office of the <u>Chef der Abwehrabteilung</u>, Naval Captain PATZIG, with a device which permitted the <u>Forschungsamt</u> to listen in en conversations conducted in his room.²¹

About the same time there were numerous complaints by officere and efficials of the Ministry regarding opened letters.

My mail sent me by my brother-in-law in New Yerk was controlled and the Gestapo Control Office in Frankfurt/Oder infermed me that a book addressed to me had been confiscated. The book was one which was much talked about

"If half in earnest, half in jest, "Tis said we spy on you with zest, Believe our honest face, I pray; .In general that is not our way."

^{21.} Compare YLICKE's statement (DF 116-AL, p. 9) "It had meanwhile been learned that various officers of the Department of Defense and of other military agencies had been under the eurosillance of organs of the Forschungsamt and that their telephone conversations had been listened to. This caused bitter feeling. The Cipher Bureau was instructed to ascertain which telephone instruments were being tapped and in which recens were lecated the microphones which had been installed in connection with repair work. It was learned that BECK, FRITSCH, and even ELOMBERG were being spied on in this fashion." In the same document FLICKE states that en the final evening in Oberhof (location of a war game in January 1934 at which SCHIMPF was present as an observer) SCHIMPF felt impelled to recite a little poem which he had written himself and which began with the words:

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at that time. I have forgotten the title and also the author. That was about 1934. About 1937 State Secretary (<u>Staatasekretaer</u>) KOERNER in the Air Minietry demanded by immediate dismissal on the basis of a complaint raised by the <u>Forschungsant</u>. One of my employees had stated that I had reviled GOERNER in Russian. This employee was an agent of the <u>Forschungsamt</u> and reported to it whatever he might lsarn.

About the same time a former employee of Chi who later went over to the <u>Forschungsamt</u> (not in the first big group) kept inquiring of me about the statue of the French section's cryptanalytic work. However, it io possible that he kept the results of his inquiries to himself because it was proven later that he had been a French ageot. SCHAPPER²² complained to Admiral CANARIS²³ about me with the aim of crowding me out of my position because he maintained I was disturbing the good understanding between the <u>Forschungsamt</u> and Chi. To the Ministry it was clear that this attack was inteoded merely as a prelude to a renewed attempt to dissolve the Cryptelogic Bureau. The aversion to me may have been of a purely personal naturs but the attacks on my percon were in reality directed against the Bureau for I had no personal connection whatever with the Forschungsamt.

In 1944, long before the attempt on HITLER's life,²⁴ General THIELE told me I should be vary cautious about telephoning even in my house in

- 22. SCHAPPER had been with OKW/Chi sioce 1929, having served in World War I in the intercept service. He had been entrusted, with the organizational side of the intercept set-up for OKW/Chi in Berlin and became the "right-hand man" for SCHIMPF in the Forschungsamt in all matters of technique and organization. At the end of the war SCHAPPER was the head of the Forschungsamt with rank of Micister Director. For a biography of SCHAPPER see Appendix III of Volume 7 (GOERING's "Research" Bureau) of the 9-volume TICCM history "European Axis Signal Intelligence in World War II".
- 23. Chief of the Abwehr after 1935.
- 24. 20 July 1944 is which Generals Erich FELIGIEBEL and Fritz India were implicated and on account of which they met death. THIELE was then Chief of Signal Command Section of OKW; FELIGIEBEL was Inspector General of Signal Troops of the Army.

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Hangeleberg bacause I must count on my phone (with secret number:) being watched. Packages which I received were opened at that time. However, it was definitely an official matter when the Forschungsamt failed to turn over the desired telegraphic traffic in spite of repeated requests. This went so far that from 1944 on requests for definite material were made only in very rare cases because the answer to be expected would turn out negative. Colonel KETTLER will confirm this.²⁵ Whatever else the Forechungsamt wished to learn regarding the accomplishments of Chi it probably heard through the Foreign Office. When after 20 July 1944 the State Security Main Office (Reichsicherheitshauptamt - RSHA) pushed itself into the foregraund and the old Abvebr practically ceased to erist, contrary to expectation a certain relaxation of tension snaued. And I am of the opinion that after SS-Brigadefuehrer SCHELLENBERG²⁶ took over official duties, everything was dropped which looked like an effort to control Chi. For to the Militaerisches Amt, insofar as SS-Men had nevly come into pesitions there, the entire military apparatus was so new that they would have found any control by any Party organs or their agents extremely disturbing.

And although Chi had long since caused to be organizationally subordinato to the <u>Abwebr</u> neverthalass a complaint to SCHELLENBERG would have been sufficient to have the matter inventigated and to have any control by outsiders and unauthorized parties stopped, in particular any control by the <u>Forschungsamt</u>, which according to a statement of SCHELLENBERG was to be dissolved just as certainly "as the Amen follows the Lord's Prayer in church".

4. Did you know of, or suspect, the presence of Gestapo or other Party agents in your organization? Did you feel that you and other competent experts had a free hand in planning and executing your tasks?

Among non-National Socialist officers and officials it was considered the rule that among three parsons who were unknown to you at least one was ar

^{25.} Chief of OKW/Chi from 1 October 1943 to ead of hostilities.

^{26.} Head of Amt VI of the RSHA, who took over the Abwehr as the Militaerisches Amt of Amt VI of the RSHA.

informer. Naturally such persons were very hard to spot bacause they operated under their cloak of anonymity. At Chi it was only once possible to unmask a confidential agent of the Forschungsent. When an opportunity offered, this parson was then transferred. If word got around that any person in high position had been arrested, then the decent supervisors admonished their people to be very cautious. In my case it often happened, for instance, that General THIELE took no aside after a lecture and admonished me not to let fall any unfavorable criticism of the political system and of HITLER; comrados and subordinates who feared their superior might have made any incautious utterances also came and begged the man, for the sake of all decant co-workers, not to risk his head to no purpose. So there was really a constant, necret struggle of the opposition against the Party and certain officers who were marked as mixed up in Party politics. Within my own unit I always had the feeling that I had a free hand in respect to the work. Never did one of my associates rebel or assume an attitude of opposition. Even the few Party members among the officials and remerve officers were absolutely dependable since their National Secialism had virtually nothing in common with the type displayed publicly. In judging this question it must not be forgotten that my subordinates and superiors could see quite clearly from the VRs²⁷ what the truth really was. Consequently in my conferences I could allow myself much freedom, since once a week SCHAEDEL 28 gave a situation report based solely on secret information available to Chi and in which therefore the press of the various countries was left out of account.

Nevertheless it is possible that even among my parsonnel there were some people who were taking note of my words in order to use them to my disadvantage, if there was a chance. However, I would not be able to name any spacific person.

27. Verlaessliche Nachrichten (Reliable Reports) - the name given to OKN/Chi dacrypted messages.

28. Head of the Archives, Section Y, Main Group B, OKN/Chi (DF 187-A, p. 11).

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5. What, in general, did OKN/Chi have to do with the Abwehr?

Chi at the time of its founding belonged as a section to the then Abwehr. This subordination, however, was always leading to conflicts arising from internal conditions; the personnel of Chi was ostensibly carried in the hudget of Abvehr while the majority of the intercept operators belonged to the Signal Corps and the equipment was provided by the Army Signal Inspectorate (Inspektion der Nachrichtentruppen). However, in the small army of 100,000, 29 where the officers of the Ministry of Defense were well acquinted with each ether, such conflicts were always quickly resolved as differences of opinion. The critical point was that the Abwehr declared that Chi as an intelligence procurement effice was a component of the competent intelligence organization, Abwehr, while the Army Signal Inspectorate insisted that Chi not only decrypted but also gathered other fundamental material dealing with communications technique which did not interest the Ahvehr at all; furthermore the Army Signal Inspectorate provided the operator personnel, the equipment, the grounds and the huildings. In this permanent conflict, which did not interfere essentially with the work, there became involved T 3, 1. e., the Third (Intelligence) Branch of the Troop Office (3. Ahteilung des Truppenants), as well as later the Branch Foreign Armies (Frende Heere). Thereupon Chi helcoged for a few weeks to T 3, because ostensihly only T 3 had any real claim to the decrypted messages of Chi. (That was about the beginning of the 30's). However, the Ahvehr established the fact that the trips abroad hy Chi, e. g., to Budapest³⁰ and Vienna, ³¹ were paid for hy it. This claim was more convincing and thereupon Chi returned as a section to the Abwehr. At the same time Chi wan

- 29. The strength allowed by the Treaty of Versailles.
- 30. For OKW/Chi's relations with the Hungarian cryptologic organization see FENNER's account in DF 187-D, pp. 1-3:
- 31. For ORW/Chi's relations with the Austrian cryptologic organization see FERNER's account in DF 187-E.

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still responsible to the Army Signal Inspectorate, marely that this latter was not concerned with decrypted diplomatic messages. However, everything elee had to be presented to the Army Signal Inspectorate. When, after the founding of the Ferschungsamt, it could be seen that GOERING intended to injsct himself into the secret intelligence cervice of the Wehrmacht, General FELIGIEREL was already entertaining the idea of freeing Chi completely of its dependence on the Abvehr. On the other hand, the interest of the Abvehr in the decrypted messages of Chi had increased materially. In the discussions which took place the Abwehr won and Chi remained with the Abwehr as Group IV, but in respect to personnel and pay it was subordinated to the Army Signal Inspectorate. When CANARIS became Chief of the Abwehr in 1935 relations became more strained. Rumors were already appearing regarding the creation of a Reichsabvehrorganisation from which General FEIIGIEBEL as Inspector General of Signal Troops expected and feared merely a etrong Party influence on the secret intelligence service. Since at that time GOERING's authority was very great, there was actually danger that in such a cane the decryptment of messages of foreign governments would be taken away from Chi and that one day the Wehrmacht would be without this information and that Chi would have to ge into a new war inadequately trained due to lack of practice material. Therefore FELLGIEBEL desired to get Chi out of the "pelitical channel" as in his conversations with me ha called this threatening danger. He made use of one of the next cenflicts to ferce the substitution of a single subordination in place of the troublesome double subordination of Chi and this time he won his point and about the middle of the 30's Chi was finally removed from the structure of the Abyehr and nuberdinated to the Army Signal Inspectorate and its successor organization. As far as official connections with the Abwehr

- these were not disturbed. The <u>Abwehr</u> received the decrypted messeages daily and on its part turned ever to Chi such information as concerned the latter. But the <u>Abwehr</u> could neither give orders nor take . disciplinary action; and the intercourse between it and Chi followed the same service principles as, for instance, between the Attache Group and Chi. In

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respect to personnel, administration and discipline the Signal Corps had sele responsibility.

6. What cooperation existed between OEW and Abwehr intercept units?

I know nothing of any such relation. And I cannot conceive that it ever existed. With my close collaboration with my chiefs I must necessarily have heard at some time that such a connection existed. No connection with the <u>Abwehr</u> ever appeared in any plan shewing distribution of assignments: Any such connection would also have run directly counter to the idea of General FELIGIEBEL; and if it had existed I should eurely have heard of it from him. Moreover, Generals THIELE and GIMMLER³² would at least have made some mention of this connection during the frequent conferences, if it had existed. After all there were only very few official secrets which remained limited to a few officers and efficials within an agency, but a permanent secret of this type would necessarily have been mentioned, for the simple reason that FIANEERT³³ and GROTZ³⁴ would not have been able to cover up the fact that they had reported to one of the officers of the <u>Abvohr</u> during their visits in Berlin.

7. What cryptanalytic work was attempted by the Waffen-SS?

I did not know that the Waffen-SS (Armed Protective Guard of the National-Socialist Party) ever made any attempt at cryptanelysis. It is possible that this question is based on a misunderstanding. When the <u>Forschungsant</u> was founded, its members formed a special SS-Fermation; in any case they were all members of the SS and were promoted in it.

(DF 187-A, p. 22).

34. Oberlt. GROTZ commanded the OKW/Chi intercept station at Sofia, Bulgaria. (DF 187-A, p. 22).

^{32.} GIMMLER, Major General, Chief of Signal Equipment and Testing Branch Army Ordnance (Wa Fruef 7) 1939-1943. After FELICIEBEL and THIELE were hanged for their participation is the attempt on HITLER's life, Major General GIMMLER successed them as Chief of the Armed Forces Signal Communications Group.

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8. What do you know about the work of agents? How was the work eet up and handled, as for instance, in the Referat Vauck?³⁵

I have already expressed my view on this. Please check my statements and reports.³⁶

Work was done on networks of the French mainland, of the Balkans and Upper Italy, in French, English and Italian (?). Possibly still other languagee uppeared but I am no longer certain because I never had any original meesages in my hands. The cryptographic systems, generally book ciphern, were in mont cases solved only subsequently, i. e., after one had succeeded in arrenting an agent who had compromising material. If the title, author and edition of the books used had become known, it was often several weeks, even in important cases, before one could precure these books. If tho fortunes of war were favorable and the nete continued in existence in upite

- 35. Referat Vauck was a German cryptanalytic section working usder a certain VAUCK on the solution of foreign agent traffic. Until mid-1944 this section was subordinated to the German Army cryptologic organization (OKH/In 7/VI) but in 1944 it was transferred to OKH/Chi. VAUCK, who was never located by TICOM for interrogation, is described by FENNER as 1.75 meters tall, broad-shouldered, fat, fair, blue-eyes, roued head, divorced, with two children, honent and fair-minded.
- 36. See the oral interrogation of FERNER, TICOM/I-200, par. 37: "VAUCK never had to deal with any American agente' eystems, but British agenta sometimes came up in the Balkans in connection with MIHAILOVIC. He never eav thin eection at work, and does not know what these messagen looked like. He knew that there was never sufficient material to break the keys, and they were only rend after the agents had been captured; he believed that traffic was occasionally read currently after the key had been compromised by one of the agents without the knowledge of others. He was unable to give any names of specific examples. In the Went, all British agent traffic was in French language, and he thought that they ware normally Frenchmon based in London. All those captured were French, and they never took any British or Americans. Two or three times, they were able to play these French agents back after they had been captured. He thought the system employed was some kind of book cipher with subtractor; TRAME would be able to give more detailn. Also Dr. KEINER worked under VAUCK, and might now be in Berlin, where before the war he had been employed in the T Te said that no special secrecy was attached to -- inside the organization. ., ..

At the end, VAUCK hnd about 12 men, originally he had had more; when OKH heard that he was to be transferred to OKW, they took the opportunity of stealing several of his people. VAUCK was a very nice, honest man, and was not a Nazi."

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of the arrest, this circumstance was utilized to stage deceptive traffic, te institute so-called "agent games". In such cases one succeeded in having arms and edibles, for instance, dropped at prearranged points or in gotting further information through the continued traffic. As a rule, however, the subsequently decrypted messages only brought confirmation of what was already known. And it is only in this that I see any results from the work. Frequently the agents called attention to the fact that people of their group had been arrested and that a change of key must be made. Once it happened that French agents made merry ever the fact that the Germans had come to block off a npot appointed for a parachute drop but did not have enough patience to wait and drove away before the machines arriving from England had dropped their lead. There may have been some 50 messagee decrypted weekly, among them some, to be euro, which were almost a year eld and henco had only historical significance. Since the arrent of the agents was not a function of the Wehrmacht and consequently the entire handling of the businese was not concentrated in the hands of one pernon, the reporting route was complicated and time was often lost uselesnly even though the opportunity for picking up the different egente was favorable. According to my experience it is a mistake if the decrypting agency and the executive powers are in different hands. Naturally there are different organs, for no one would think of assigning police duties to his cryptanalysts, but the German mietake was that the Wehrmacht gathered all necessary information but then had to turn over the executive action and let the SD wind up the affair. Precisely in this connection the constant tension between "Field Gray" and "Brown" or "Black" had especially hermful consequences.

I can give absolutely no details regarding the constitution of the solved orver arived the completely decrypted messages for my information, for the most part they were already eld and therefore without much current interent. In order not to lose time, VAUCK reported immediately and independently to the executive unit as soon as a decryption was made, while the offices of the <u>Wehrmacht</u> which might be involved merely received the decrypted messages for their information.

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9. What was your opinion of the papers circulated hy SCHAUFFLER in the Auswaertige Aut? Did you ever contribute to these papers?³⁷

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Since Dr. SCHAUFFLER was considered an analyst, I assume that the "Technical Reports" ("<u>Technische Berichte</u>") contained the description of the course of solution of some complicated cryptographic system. I think I recall that the Foreign Office did not prepare regular reports hut only issued one from time to time when a system had here solved. Possibly some such report is involved in the question. I never got to see one of these technical reports.

Since SCHAUFFLER was an experienced cryptologist and a nbrewd person, I assume that his reports were sensible and contained only what was essential. I never wrote anything for the Foreign Office. This does not exclude the possibility that some one of my reports or drafts was handed over hy my Chief to the Foreign Office (Cryptologic Bureau) for then to read without my being informed of the fact. In that case, however, such papers would not have been iosued under my name but quite certainly over the signature of one of my superiors.

10. What can you tell shout German General Staff Intelligence Studies on Russin? What agencies existed for the gathering of material for the intelligence studies, who composed the personnel, and what was the product of their work? Were publications of such agencies distributed generally to cryptographic or cryptanalytic units?

A few times there "passed over" my desk, i. e., were routed to me for information, maps with entries on the occurrence of raw materials such as iron, copper, etc.; hemp, flax and othor raw material of the textile industry; areas with surplus grain and areas with grain shortages, and dozens of other materials of economic importance from the USSR. With these there were statistice, diagrams and accompanying text. The pamphlets were about 30 cm x 40 cm in size; their classification was TOP SECRET (geneime Kommandosache). I never pair any account of the data or who worked them up. In conversation with

37. For examples of the type of papers meant see TICOM/D-3 and D-33 in which are collected translations of the technical papers written by members of the Foreign Office Cryptologic Bureau and circulated within the Bureau.

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a colleague we assumed that the HAUSEOFER's, father and son, ware concerned in the work. So far as I know, both later fell into disfavor with HITLER. No published information was known to me. Since I am not an aconomist, my judgment is that of a layman, but I did get the impression that these studies had been prepared with care and with an excellent professional background.

11. What de you know about the Russian signal intelligence organization? Did the Germans have any contact with the Russians, White or Red?

No. I am not acquainted with that field. Again I would refer to the fermer Russian officer SACEARCH interned in <u>Haus Alaska³⁸</u> who is sursly woll informed on this point because he was an expert.

12. What was published by the Germans concerning Russian order of battle? By whom was it published and when? Are there any copies to be found?

I cannot answer this question because the matter is entirally beyond my knowledge.

13. Did OKW/Chi keep a list of terms of Russian mechanized equipment, guns, planes, etc.?

No such compilation is known to me because that field lay outside my range of activity. I assume there is an error here: probably the Army Cryptologic Agency (OKH/In 7/VI) did compile such lists and possibly the Oránance Office (Waffenant) as well.

14. Are any atlases and maps of Russia available? What sert were available and by whom were they prepared?

The problem of procuring maps of Seviet Russia is difficult. The captured material was re-worked in Berlin in a cartographic office of OKW since reproductions, with place names in Latin script, were required. I know that even in 1944 the collection was ntill far from complete and that maps of all types were gladly accepted. Once Chi received some captured maps from the

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^{38.} During his period of intra-Europe FERNER was interned at the European Command Intelligence Center (ECIC) at Haus Alaska, a private residence at the Center reserved for important persons under interrogation. SACHARON was interned there at this time and was being interrogated by the Director of Intelligence, European Command. No interrogation of SACHARON was made by the TICOM representative.

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Cryptologic Bureau Relsingfors (Mikkeli)³⁹ which were taken at once to the above-mentioned office. They had merely been loaned by Mikkeli and the reproduction had to be carried out quickly. These were maps of sastern Karelia. The Russians had eld maps from the Czarist period in the ratio 1: 42,000; 1: 84,000; and 1: 168,000 and new maps in the ratio 1: 25,000; 1: 50.000; 1: 100.000 as the most important General Staff map, also in the ratio 1: 2,500,000 and 1: 5,000,000. Only the westers border areas and some sections of east Aeia were based on new measurements while the other metric maps were merely recomputed from the old measurements. So far as I know all maps were based on military surveys since only maps of insignificant areas vere made for civilian use. I can give no information as to the value of tho maps. They were printed in four colors, nometimes in more. The old maps from the Crarist period were black lithographs and of no value to artillery men. The new maps are said to have been more exact, particularly the newly curveyed vectors areas. East Asia was surveyed in large part from the air. Who prepared and drew the German (criginally Russian) reproductions I do not know. I have forgotten the official title of the cartographic office but it can be found in telephone directories of OEW. The office with which I had to do once was in Lustzowstrasse. All the new Russian maps were recomputed on Krueger-Gauss coordinates with Greenwich as 0°. For daily use Chi preferred the atlases of Stieler, Velhagen und Klasing, and Ullatein: otherwise the official maps which were available and which the other groups of Chi required for their work (cable lines, high-power transmitters, intercept arean, etc.), were used.

15. What was the procedure with German patents on communications equipment? Were there any "secret" lists of such patents? Where would they be now?

39. The Finnish Cryptologic Bureau which had been located at Helsingfors (Helsinki) was shifted during World War II to Mikkeli.

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New York foreign patent lawyer can give you full information regarding the procedure. If it was in the interest of the national defense or of the security of the country that a patent, hence also the letter patent, should not be turned over to the public, then a secret patent was granted upon application for a secret patent and an examination of the application. The only characteristic of a secret patent was that the letter patent was not made public. According to patent law all other lotters patent can be examined in the German Patent Office. Letters patent for secret patents could only be seen by a person who had received permission from the German Patent Offics. Such permission or approval was granted to but n faw people, naturally upon application. It is a matter of course that national defense was given special consideration in this connection. Thus the Cipher Machine Company Enigna had secret patents; so too, of course, did Siemens and other big companies which had armament contracts. Special lists wern kept of secret patents. Then if a representative of the agency, let us say Oberinspektor MENZER, came to the competent official of the Gorman Patent Office, a list of the most recent secret patents was shown him. The idea that possession of the patent document is identical with the possession of the necessary knowledge is obviously arroneous. In Germany it is the idea that is patented. The realization of that idea is shown to be possible, to be sure, but the road from the protected patent claim to the completed construction is long and full of surprises. If cipber devices of any kind were to be patented by ONA, then the paper work was performed in the Ordnance Office (Waffenamt). The Ordnance Office filed the patent claim; it also paid from public funds the examiners' fens and the patent fees until the patent expired after 25 years. Of course, the Ordnance Office kept lists of the secret patents for which it had applied and which had been approved by the Patent Office. What became of "

16. Do you recall any leads or ideas of American, British, or other nationality putents which were important to the work of OKW/Chi?

I do not know any American or English patents in the fisid of cipher, machines. When Chi was negotiating with Siemens in the 20's for the construction

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of their cipber machineo, the American HEBERN was zentioned among foreign inventors. Chi had a prospectus of his machine but the description was naturally in such general terms that there was no information regarding the method of encipherment itself. OKW/Cbi never did find out whether any machines of the Hebern-Electric type were actually built. I do not know that American or English patents were ever useful for the work of Cbi or furthered the development of German ideas by providing valuable information. However, my judgment may only be subjectively correct because I do not know the foreign cryptographic patent objectively enough to have a right to venture an opicion. 17. Do you know the manes of any American, British or Russian

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cryptologists?

I do not know the name of a single American, English or Russian cryptanalyst.

On the banis of the book by YARDLEY⁴⁰ it was revealed that <u>America</u> did cryptanalytic work during the First World War with very good results. Nothing was more natural than to assume that America would also use this exact means of obtaining intelligence in this war. During the war an American newspaper published a short article on some USA organization which was fixing the nationality and location of unknown foreign transmitters in an exceedingly short time. Now since such recognition is not always possible unless the radiogram is decrypted, Chi concluded from this that America must have a cryptanalytic unit on a broad foundation. But, even if this report should have been exaggerated, it must be assumed at least that people were busying themselves with this problem in the USA. There was oothing to justify the assumption that this organization would have to be an insignificant one! Later there came from Africa the entirely credible, although unconfirmed, report that the USA was maintaining a cryptanalytic service there using Hollerith machines. At OKN/Cbi it was therefore considered a fact that

40. YARDLEY, Herbert Osborne, "The American Black Chamber", Indianayolis and London: the Bobbe-Merrill Co., 1931. Reprinted, New York, 1933, London, 1934. History and work of the Cryptographic Bureau, officially known as Soction No. 8 of the Military Intelligence Division (MI-8).

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cryptanalytic work was being done in America. After the landing in France in connection with some operation or other a secret report of the American Signal Corpo fell into German hands. In this report there was also something on the question of cryptanalysis. In that connection I got the impression that in American military circles, just as in German circlen, the question was occasionally raised whether the whole cryptanalytic effort made any sense whatsoever! I knew from my own experience these questions which allow one to infer a priori that the questioner considers every decrypted message a successful fraud which the energy has thought up cunningly; less intelligent people even go so far as to ask: "Why don't you decrypt only the important messages?" In any event the American critic came to the leconic decision: "Either the decrypted message contains the truth or po truth at all!" Such a saying could only be coined by a man who not only has a thorough technical knowledge of cryptanalysis but has had a chance to convince himself frequently of the connection between the decrypted usessage and the truth. Consequently there was absolutely no more room for doubt an to the existence of an American cryptanalytic service under purposeful leadership. I never heard about the English cryptanalytic unit. Chi assumed as a matter of course that, due to the success of Sir Alfred Eving in World War I, the cryptanalytic service would be in capable hands this time, too. 41 When during this war England endeavored to recommend to the Turkish Government the use of an English sryptographic system at Ankara, this did not remain concealed from Chi, and the only

^{41.} A reference to the speech delivered 13 December 1927 to the members of the Edinburgh Philosophical Institution by Sir Alfred Ewing, Principal of Edinburgh University, a complete report of which was issued with Lord Balfour's tribute to Sir Alfred Ewing in the Edinburgh newspaper, The Scotsman of 14 December 1927. In the speech Sir Alfred Ewing gave an account of the secret service work in which he was engaged during the war. Though the main features of the work had been disclosed before (for example, in Mr. Winston Churchill's The World Crisis and in the Memorion of Lord Fisher, Admiral of the Fleet) Sir Alfred Ewing recounted for the first time many dotails in connection with the British World War I cryptenalytic unit of which he was the head. This branch of the Admiralty service, called "Reco 40", also received much attention in the life of Sir Alfred Ewing written by his son under the title: "The Man of Room 40 - The Life of Sir Alfred Ewing" by A. W. Ewing, Hutchinson and Co., (Publishers) Ltd.

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possible deduction to be drawn was that England was egain active in this field and was reading the Turkieh systems at least. But if England was working successfully on Turkey, then there was nothing in the way of its working on other countries since some of the French diplomatic systems were certainly no more difficult than the Turkish. There was an unconfirmed report after the First World War to the offect that nome former Russian saval officers who had worked during the war on messages of the Gormas Baltic Fleet vers engaged is the cryptologic work of the Kremlin at Moscow. From the development of the Russian Governmeat cryptographic systems from types which could still be solved down to the digit codes with groups of different lengths and with one-time additive pad which cannot be colved with even the most modern meane, the inforeace must be drawn that there are in Moscow at least a few men who investigate their own cryptographic systems, ascertain the weaknesses and regularly provide for replacement whenever a system begins to compromise itself due to over-extensive use. Reports on the strict selection of personnel in the Fourth Section of the Russian Coneral Staff also suggest at the same time that there, too, the question of the escurity of cryptographic systems is given increased importance. However, the purely analytic knowledge of the cryptographer cannot be separated from the knowledge of the cryptanelyst. In reality it is the latter who, according to my experience, fructifies the cryptography of his own cauntry. I have never sees things go the other way. For this reason it was assumed with a probability bordering on certainty that Meacow has a cryptanalytic service.

In captured Russian cryptographic instructions of the army there was found such a clear expression of ideas, such an exact differentiation between "digit" (<u>Ziffer</u>) and "number" (<u>Zahl</u>) that what was to be found there was no thoughtless piling up of words but rather a classic clarification of words by people who must certainly have occupied themselves with cryptenalysis. The similarity between diplomatic systems and those of the highest staffs also let it be recognized that the ideas all came from under the same hat and Chi

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therefore regarded as proven that there was a single central cryptologic agency in Moscow.

13. Do you know of any cryptographic organization of a public character in Europe? If so, what were the names and locations of much societies? Do you know the names of any membern?

Shortly before the outbreak of the war one of my cryptanalystn brought me a little announcement taken from a French journal which advertined a course in cryptanalysis. I believe the price was 20 france. Regarding this information some remarks were made concerning the naivete of the people and the sunpicion that possibly the French General Staff was behind it. But no attempt was made to follow up the matter and it goen without saying that we did not write to this organization because our security rules forbade it. Certainly Chi did not expect any success from a camcuflaged inquiry. The seat of the organization was Paris, if I remember rightly. I do not know the name.

- 19. Give an account of your liaison with the Japanese mationals NISHI and SAKURAL.
- 42. This question was put to FENNER in written form because of a doubt which arose in the minds of the interrogators at his oral interrogation concerning the relations of OKM/Chi and the Japanese. At the first interrogation of FENNER (17 Sep 1946), he admitted having known HAYASHI, who had come to Berlin at the beginning of the war and had given the Germans the originals of the Brown and Gray Codes; FENNER claimed, however, that he did not know how they had obtained these books, and he said nothing was exchanged between OKW/Chi and Tokyo though this might have been done butween OKH and Tokyo. At the third interrogation of FERNER (19 Sep 1946) FERNER was asked whather he knew the Japaness NISHI and SAKURAI. At that time FENNER replied that he knew both of them raguely, but had little contact with them. NISHI had been at Budapest with HAYASHI: SAKURAI remained in Berlin, but FEMMER claimed to have seen him only three times. FENNER was then informed by the interrogatorn that KETTLER had stated, FENNER had passed American and other material to these two men. According to the report of interregation: "FEIMER was very ntartied, and said that he had helped then with Russian and American traffic, mainly by giving them raw material. Further questions elicited that he had also given them copies of the VNn, nainly American and French decodes. KETTURE had ordered him to give them everything they asked for. It was pointed out to him that this hardly conformed with his previous ntatement that the liaison was

vory weak. He neid that he had meant "npiritually" (geistig) ... not "practically" weak. Both prisoner and interrogators romained unimpresend by this argument, and FENNER was told to give a written account of the whole episode." (Excerpted from TICCM/I-201, paragraphs 1 and 29). FENNER's answer here coincides substantially with the description of the relations of OKW/Chi and Japan, as given by him in DF 187-D, pp. 9-10.

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I never worked with the Japanese NISHI or with SAEURAL or with any Japanese at all.

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I have already stated at my interrogation that HAYASEI arrived in Berlin shortly after the cutbreak of the war and brought Chi the American Brown and Gray codes. Later on HAYASHI sometimes made statements regarding Soviet Army systems which had supposedly turned up in the Far East. There reports were noted and thereupon regarded as sattled because they had no practical value, either because the information was not pertiment or because the observations, although correct, did not apply to the German Eastern Front. Chi and HAYASHI were at that time less interested in any particular system than in proving or checking the assumption that Army nystems which had been replaced at the Soviet West Front might turn up at the East Front in Asia. All the information HAYASHI was able to get from Tokyo in this respect was so sketchy that it was not pessible to prove that nystems which had been replaced on the West Front ever did turn up in East Asia. Chi was never ablo to get a systematic account of the cryptographic systems used by the Soviet Army in East Asia.

Already at an interrogation I stated that the relations between Chi and the Japanese were of a superficial nature. This is not changed at all by the fact that the Japaness received material from Chi. The relatice remained superficial because there could be no collaboration between Chi and Tokyo. I have already pointed out that HAYASHI was practically cut off from Tokyo, that there could be no thought of regular courier connections and that there was no regular interchange of telegrams between HAYASHI and his home office. So, if I was occasionally called in when HAYASHI was calling on my Chief, we talked in a friendly way about all possible things except cryptanalysis. In

vas called in, probably because KETTLER wished to hear my opinion. HAYASHI said he was no longer getting any information of any practical use asd he therefore asked that we let him have VNs for his information. It was clear to us that such information would paturally get to the Military Attache and

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the Ambassador bimself. Therefore it was impossible for us to promise HAYASHI anything on our own responsibility. However, KETTLER put that up to his Chief,43 who supposedly discussed it with JODL and, on the basis of a basic order that the Japanese were to be given anything they wished, I was informed that VNs might be given the Japanese to a limited extent. It was agreed with HAYASHI that he was to have these WNs picked up once a week at my office, but only efter calling on the phone so as to avoid coming to no purpose. This happened and at intervals of a week, later only every two weeks, NISHI or SAKURAI received come VHs in my front office or from me parsonelly. These VNs were not limited to these dealing with America or any other country but whatever might be of value was turned over as we saw fit. The first four or five batches were solected by my section heads for the different countries. That did not work because I did not get the messagee on time, insemuch as they had to be gone through and recorded; for instance no Whe ware to be turned over which night be damaging to German interests in any way. In short, to unify things I instructed Dr. SCHAEDEL of the Archiven to pick out suitable WNn. And this was done with the necessary tact. In approximately five months the Japanese in Berlin received at most 10 such selections. Each batch contained less than 20 VKn. In February there were no deliveries to the Japanese, the crouse being the air attacks. It was also due to the ever more evident development of the military-political cituation which would in any event have led to an interruption of our relations with Japan. When HAYASHI became Military Attache in Budapest he asked, curiously encugh, for the occasional mending of English telegrams in plain cods. Ostennibly he wanted to work on this traffic along with several gentlemen.

43. At that time presumably Generalmajor GIMMER, Chief of the Armed Forces Signal Communications Group, or Generalmajor PRAUN, Chief of the Signal Communications Affairs.

44. Generaloberst JODL, Chief of the Armed Forcen Operations Staff.

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Three or four times HAYASHI received some "practice messages"; then the delivery of such material ceased because in view of the now difficult communication it was only a useless bother, even though only a few telegrams were involved. HAYASHI received this material through the Chief of the Hungarian cryptanalytic unit.⁴⁵

NISHI was ostensibly an assistant to the Military Attache. Late in 1944 or early in 1945 he became Lieutenant Colonel. What his functions were I do not know. I do not know the rank of SAKURAI nor do I know what duties he was nuppesed to perform. I once talked with the Military Attache himself: it was one forenoon in 1945. We drank cognac on an empty etomach and said not a word about military affairs. I did not become acquainted with other Japanese.

20. What use did cryptanalysts make of OEW/Chi library and archives? How were reference materials such as news broadcasts made available to cryptanalysts? What were the reference materials available? Where are thoy now?46

Every practical cryptanalyst knows how frequently hn encounters place

or family names of which he has been able to interpret only a part. Every practical cryptanalynt knows how often in partially nolved telegrams current events are mentioned for which he doen not know the precise political terms. Every practical cryptanalyst also knows how important it is if he can ascertain quickly what important thing has happened on that day, not only at home but throughout the whole world which may tis in with the name he has interpreted and the time he has fixed. And suppose an event lies many months back; one cannot expect the cryptanalyst to burden his memory with a lot of ballast which is quite unnecessary for him. One need only to imagine how agreeable it is for the analyst if he has a readily accessible central unit

- 45. General Istvan von PETRIKOVITS. For the relations of OKW/Chi and the Hungarian cryptanalytic unit see DF 187-D, pp. 1-3.
- 46. For an excellent discussion of the Archives of OKW/Chi and their importance see the translation of a lecture on the OKW/Chi archives delivered in March 1945. "The Significance of the Archive as Aid to Cryptanalysis and a Source of Information". (DF 204).

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which gives him all conceivable information. The information service of the Archives was an institution which was used day in and day out. As far as I can recall, the Archives got seven questions in the first week, some 70 in the second week; no further count was kept because the idea had taken hold and was fully appreciated by all the cryptanalysts.

The actual secret Archive of Chi was prohably hurned in Werfen. Part of the file of decrypted messages (<u>VN-Archive</u>) was completely hurned at the time of the sir attack on 24 November 1943; those were the messages of the years 1940 to August/September 1943. Older messages, down to abaut 1937 were located with the Chief of the Army Archives in Potndam and in part in the document room of the Ministry on the Landwehrkanal, in the huilding at Tirpitzufer 38/42. What became of these documents I do not know.

21. Did OKW/Chi keep a list of abbreviations, of terms of standard translation or special phrases? Where is this material now?

For years OKW/Chi kept alphahetic lists of foreign abbreviations and their meanings written out in the foreign language and with German equivalents. I think these lists were compiled in Group I.⁴⁷ These lists were supplied to me⁴⁸ hut were practically unnecessary because none of the cryptanalysts made use of them. The few abbreviations appearing in encrypted messages were known or were seen interpreted. Those working on press and propaganda transmissions may have needed these abbreviations, hut I am not sure.⁴⁹ I never saw translations of special phrases. There were lists of English, American, French, Russian and Italian abbreviations. I hurned in Berlin the lists charged to ms; the other groups probably did that in Werfen.

48. FENNER was chief of Group IV: charged with the decryptment of foreign cryptograme.

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49. Group III under Major KAEHIER was charged with the interception of foreign press and propaganda.

^{47.} FENNER refers here presumably to the pre-1944 organization of OKW/Chi, in which Chi consinted of four Groups: I, II, III, IV. Group I under Major ANDRAE was charged with a price of technical and personnel resources to the pre-1944 organization of OKW/Chi, in which Chi consinted of four Groups: I, II, III, IV. Group I under Major ANDRAE was charged with a price of technical and personnel resources to the pre-1944 organization of OKW/Chi, in which Chi consinted of four Groups: I, II, III, IV. Group I under Major ANDRAE was charged with a price of technical and personnel resources to the pre-1944 organization of OKW/Chi, in which Chi consinted of four Groups: I, II, III, IV. Group I under The pre-1944 organization of OKW/Chi, Major ANDRAE was charged of four Groups: I, II, III, IV. Group I under The pre-1944 organization of technical and personnel (Crophysical and personnel)

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22. What dictionaries were used by OKW/Chi? Ars any now available? Describe the work done by Sdf. KUEEN on military dictionaries.

Chi used the dictionaries ordinarily used in Central Europe. These were published by Toussaint-Langenscheidt, Schmidt, Sachs-Villatte, Pawlowski and others whose names I do not know. Mest of the dictionaries were the private property of the cryptanalysts. The firm Harrassovitz in Leipzig could give the best information on dictionaries including those in oriental languages. However, all these dictionaries had the disadvantage that the newly created words of diplomatic policy could not be contained in them. These coacepts and the corresponding terms the cryptanalysts had to memorize in their practical work. But no collection of these new words was compiled. KUEHN did not come to my unit until the end of 1944. The reason was as follows. The need for military dictionaries was, of course, great. For the development of the military language is much more stormy than that of scholars and diplomats. Not merely does military technique leave its imprint hut even the jargon of the soldiers affects it. Everybody who translated and everybody who came into direct contact with the energy linguistically peeded dictionaries. The result was that dictionaries were compiled in various offices. Industry and zeal may have been displayed in the process but there was not always the requisite special knowledge which is indispensable if something is to be created that will be good even a decade later. In order to avoid waste, to produce something unified and not to use up needlessly paper which was already in very short supply, Chi asked KEITEL to issue an order according to which the preparation of all military dictionaries would be turned over to me. After all, the best trained philologists were working under me and nowhere else was there such a logical place to collect the entire vocabulary required and to provide illustrations of use such -~~ "Me dictionary. The suggestion was approved and I took over KUEHN with the few people he had. Late in 1944 and early in 1945 the compilation of the English military dictionary with consideration of "slang" as a part of the scheduled work was drawing to an end. The proof sheets were already being gone over. A Russian military

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dictionary was in the preliminary stageo. The material was burned at Werfen. Possibly KUEEN saved some private material. I expected a great deal of this work myself because the extent of the work, the exactitude of the collection, and the arrangement of the books, would certainly have met with approval abroad after the war.

23. Do you feel that information produced by the cryptanalytic people wan properly bandled? Who evaluated the information? How and to whom was it disseminated? What did the recipients do with it?

I bad the impression and gradually became convinced that the eccret Archive (Information Section) evaluated the VNs carefully and according to correct principles; otherwise requests would not have come in from outsids agencies. I know, for example, that the General Staff once wanted to find cut quickly whether enything was known from the VNs or other sources regarding Sovist Russian preparations for war. While previously the answer to such a question was incomplete and took three days, the complete, fluiched answer could now be given in three hours. The Archive gave only objective information without any interpretation or criticism. At a time when propaganda is endeavoring to dim the eyes of even the shrewdest people to reality, the mere existence of such an information unit based upon documents would have proven its worth in a very short time. As long as this Archive was still under my centrol, it was my ambition and that of my associates to create an institution which would tell the truth and would therefore enjoy complete cuafidence. The time for creating such an organization had meanwhile become ripe.

The distribution plan for the VNs is not known to me. Consequently my knowledge in this regard is extremely sketchy. Lieutenast Colonel von KALCKSTEIN⁵⁰ or Dr. SCHAEDEL⁵¹ could best give information.

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^{50.} See DF 187-A, p. 11 where Oberstlt. With the second RIN is entered as the Chief of Section X. As Telegrams. Day Book) Main Group B. For FENNER's characterization of you KALCKSTEIN, see DF 187-E, p. 18.

^{51.} See DF 187-A, p. 11, where Dr. Herbert SCHAEDEL is entered as head of Section Y. (Carding items from decrypted messages and from plain-text messages, distribution of secret information). Main Group B. Dr. SCHAEDEL had been instructor at the University of Leipzig. For FENNER's characterization of SCHAEDEL see DF 187-E, p. 24.

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My office was merely told how many copies of the VNs were to be made. Distribution of the VNs and control of them was not in my bands, noither was the picking out of specific VNs which were required for any particular purpose.

Cryptenalytic reports, as I have already stated, were originally written once a month, then perbaps from 1927 on only every three months. There were about five copies in all. From 1933 on, only annual reports were prepared, generally in two copies, in a few exceptional cases in three copies. 24. Describe the preparation, selection of material, publication, translation, and distribution of the WNs.

Preparation: The entire traffic was sorted in the Telegrer Registry,⁵² separated according to countries, and collivered as quickly as possible to the head of the pertinent Language section or his representative. There the material was divided according to four points of view: messages currently able to be decrypted; messages worked on but not yet able to be decrypted; unknown, i. e., those cryptographic systems not yet analyzed; and rejects, insofar as these had not been eliminated in the Registry.

Messages currently able to be decrypted were freed of their reencipherment or immediately decrypted, and the messages not yet "ripe for VNs" were placed in the hands of an expert. Unknown systems went into a special collection and were "observed" as we said at Chi, i. e., watched for similarity of type, the frequency of the messages sent, in sbort all criteria which we desired to have cleared up before engaging in systematic work on a system. I have already said elsewhere that good philologists decoded telegrams using the solved codes. In so doing newly obtained interpretations were naturally filled in, even in those codes which were in an advanced stage of solution. I say to it that even a clever man did not have to work on more than two plain codes unless solution had already progressed so far a decoded telegrams had been stripped of encipherment and decoded, one hegan the

52. According to the OEW/Chi organizational chart of 1944, the Telegram Registry was under Group a of Main Group B. (DF 187-A, p. 5).

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Selection: The practiced cryptanalyst sees very quickly whether a telegram contains political or military-political information or merely administrative matters which are of no special importance. So-called passport messagee are quickly recognized, as are also the reproduction of voices of the press. Of these messages only relatively few could claim any objective interest. Moreover I had observed that nothing is so likely to minimize the value of the VNs in the eyes of those who receive them and do not realize how much effort it costs to produce them as to include every unimportant matter! Therefore in selecting the VNs to be produced we considered as important: the daily situation reports of the Ambassadors and Ministers; corrects of the press, because from these the specific attitude of the foreign countries toward certain problems could be seen; and finally actually new reports and instructions from the central authority to its Ambassadors, Ministers Plenipotentiary, and Ministers (and vice versa). According to my observations over many years there was generally seven times as much decrypted as wan issued in the form of a VN! It is true, I occasionally got instructions that special importance attached to certain messages but such instructions always coincided with the opinions of myself and my colleagues. I gave my co-workers as free a hand as possible in the selection. I could do this without feeling concerned for it is the natural ambition of the cryptanalyot to offer as objectively interesting information as possible, even though messages which were only subjectively interesting contributed to the eilent satisfaction of the workers, e.g., the description of a supper at which certain gentlemen handled knife and fork in a not exactly skillful manner. The many passport and economic messages were of no interest higher up but if they were included occasionally, likewise even less important messages, that was usually due to the fact that the englyst on the basis of his knowledge attributed greater importance to such messages than his superior, for instance, who was primarily interested in the press. The question of what was really important was rever correctly answered and can never be answered in a completely satisfactory way, because a message which was quite unimportant today may be very important two years hence! I and my collaagues took the point of view, therefore, that it was better to hring too many

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"intrportant messages than to have failed to bring some important ones as VNs: "Let the gentlemes at the top separate the chaff from the wheat!"

In the case of Army radiograms there could be to rule of thumb in evaluation. A seemingly indignificant message in which a new military unit is named can under some circumstances he more important than a decrypted order to attack which is miready known from some other source. For this reason the decrypted radiograms of foreign armies were never included in the duily edition of the VNs; decrypted Army radiograms were also called VMs but they went into other bands where each individual message called for a careful going over. This work is a special field, with the interpretation of call signs, the attempt to show any existing periodicity in the use of call signs and wave lengths, with the proliminary evaluation, the various card files, the actual message evaluation and the final evaluation which is crystallized in a uniform report which in turn has nothing to do with the necessary putting of these secrets to good use.

Translation: Great stress was put on good translation. It was necessary to translate because with the multitude of languages worked on it was inconceivable that the officers charged with further processing would know all these languages well enough to understand correctly a decrypted message where the grammar often departed from accepted rules. In each election there was at least one cryptannlyst who knew German and the foreign language eo well that in cases of doubt the German text could be brought to bim for checking and for a decision. Naturally it was required that such differences as:

govicelich	certainerest
eicherlich	strenent
ant	plus de, soulement
bloss	pes autrement, simple
anacheinend	probable
acheirbar	apparent

he correctly rendered, likewise the designations of offices and officials. Anything which might perhaps be fulne in the translation had to be indicated as questionable, originally by a question mark in parenthesis after the dubicus

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word, later on the passage which night be ineract was underscored with a broken line. Keverthelees it probably happened that in view of the number of new technical expressions which were always coming up, one or another was not correctly readered. The decisive factor was therefore the correct <u>sense</u> of the VN; and consequently any attempt to complete an incomplete meamage on one in own responsibility was strictly taken. For the same reason it was forbidden to verve personal remarks into a VN: the VN must approach as far as possible the objective communication. Otherwise it would have ceased to be a <u>Verlagenticke Neckricht</u>, i. e., a piece of reliable intelligence. Keenes if a message appeared important enough to be issued as a VN and if it had been translated into German, then it was written as a VN.

Distribution: Each VN carried in the heading the designation Chi and VN, also a potation whether the decrypted mesnage had been east by radio or cable. Then followed a definite statement of nationality, because the language alone was not sufficient since Egypt, for instance, used a French code. Furthermore each VN had to contain data which stamped it as an indisputable document: telegrem date and, if prenent, the journal number of the telegram. Otherwise in case of the publication of historical commentaries or sources by the opponent the assertion could have been made that the VN was not genuine: Finally each VN had in the lover laft corner a brief potation of distribution. R. G., "Abw 4 x ". This signified that four copies of this VN had been delivered to the Abwehr. This rotation remained when Chi had long since coased to be a part of the Abwehr and other agencies besides the Abwehr were provided with WHE. However, on exact distribution list was not to be given on the VN for obvious In this notation, therefore, only the number agrees with the facts, always providing that 41 is mentally added because each section had its own complete VN collection in order to be able to look up at any time solved telegrens or groups which had already occurred, etc. However, these copies could never show up enywhere because otherwise they would have had to be registered as TOP SECRET (geheime Kommandceache) documents and the mechanics of the office

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would have become still more complicated. Finally there stood in the lower right corner (likewize on the last sheet) of a VN a brief indication of the cryptographic system used, s.g., F 21 or Am 1 or Rum 3, etc. That signified: France, cryptographic oystem Nr. 21, i. e., the 21st Fronch system solved at Chi after the First World War; the first American system solvod at Cbi after the First World War; the third Roumanian system colved. However, it also happened that this notation was made more explicit, i. c., that the entire formulae of the system involved was written down, e.g., P4ZCuZu4 which oignified: Polish 4-digit code, reenciphered by means of an additive sequence, fourth system solved. Later, however, these designations wars often made only on the copy remaining in the cection, hence it is not absolutely necessary that a genuine VN shall show this notation because the notation was significant only within the unit. On many VNs there stands in addition to this notation the initials of the responsible oryptanalyst and my own, which later dropped out because it was quito imposoible to read and nign each individual VN. The reproduction of the VNs down to the last months of the war was by typewriter using carbons. This led to bothersome complaints since the carbon paper grav poorer during the war and the carbon copies likewise. Not until 1944 was I able to get authority to have the VNs written on waxed plates and run off in the requisite number. Once the requisite number of copies had been prepared, they were taken without loos of time to Lieutenant Colonel you KALCKSTEIN who undertook and was responsible for further processing and distribution. In him office was to be found the copy which ultimately came into the Archives. These copies came at first by the year, later by the month in loss-leaf binders and were delivered to the Chief of the Army Archives in Potsdam, Hans-von-Seccht-Strasso 8, when it was to be assumed that Cbi would no longer bo interented in the back numbers. Thus there were delivered to the Chief of the Army Archives all the WNs of the first postvar pariod down, I should say, to the end of 1930; the remaining material which was ready for the Archives was in the main building in the Tirpitzufer and in my office where several ennual files were burned. The binders were numbered sorially, consequently the genuineness of such a document could be checked at any time.

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cryptogram host its dominant position as the panaces for the pains of helplesupess and became a means to a conscious end; the eye became more keen for the possible appearance of characteristic features, the imagination was stimulated and the confusion of cryptanalysis with the concept of a "Black Art" disappeared.

When now in the course of years my personnel had been greatly enlarged, usy assignments were added and the daily administrative tasks bound ne more to my deak thus to the Lecture room, when I myself had become more mature and had become convinced of what I ought better to have done, I decided to give a different form to the instruction. I gathered together in a special course on "General Cryptology" those younger cryptennlysts who after they had been observed for one or more years while engaged in practical work were designated by their section heads as gifted and I gave them instruction two days a week from 1500 hours to 1700 hours: in the first winter semester on substitution systems as basic systems and in the second winter semester on transposition systems as basic systems and on simple combined systems as well as the most frequent types of reencipherment. What had proven good in my earlier teaching I retained. Anything that bordered on play I touched on only briefly, without laying any weight on it. But the most important principles of psychology and logic were included because many of my pupils were university graduates and were receptive to a presentation which at least attempted to show the relation betweer cryptology and the other branches of science, in short to present cryptclogy itself as a acience. With full conviction, however, I ntuck to a simple, really primitive presentation of all the material because for enlivening the instruction I used the examples themselves, historical observa-~~... tions, pedagogic hints, and critiinformation had been gained meanwhile it was worked into the material so that the pupils after two years had been familiarized with the basic principles of modern cryptanalysis. If I noticed that one of the pupils was not up to the requirements, I reserved the right to cross him off the list of participants. In this way I

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As to the actual distribution I can tall acthing, as I have already stated elsewhere. I did not concern myself with it and it was you KALCESTEIN's duty to accomplish the distribution and Likevise to check the copies returned. As I recall, there were some 10 copies of each VH prepared toward the last. The master sheets were burned in my office after they had been used. Before distribution of the WNs the most important passages wowa underscored by won KALCESTEIN and his assistante to make possible a rapid scanning of the material. As to the value of such a measure opinions varied greatly. SCHAEDEL and I disapproved of this method of "predigestion" because it involved a risk that the VNs would be deprived of their character as eepecially valuable secret intelligence eince the reader skimmed such propared reports just as superficially and casually as he did all others. We both maintained that n VN should only get into the hands of poople who have time enough to look at them until the reader had completely understood them. These who want to read WNs just for sensational items have no right to get them! However, as I have said, other people were of a different opinion and underscored certain words in the VNs with colored peacil. Assuming vise and serious readers, this mathod may be very helpful, but only under the assumption I have just inde. After I had succeeded in baving the Wis multigraphed, each one was nlso marked with the call sign benenth the heading, in case it was a rediogram (to aid the statistical work of other groups of Chi) and was provided with a brief summary. That had to be done because hand in hand with the modernization of our reproduction went the organization of the Archives and the Information Section. Furthermore I desired by indicating the centent to render the timeconsuming underscoring unnecessary and niso to force the cryptunalyst and

-lator to pay strict attention to the cense of what was decrypted. The other date remained just as I have described here.

<u>Publication</u>: The publication of VNe was strictly forbidden. Every VN was marked "<u>geheime Kommandosache</u>" (TOP SECRET) and therefore was most carefully safeguarded. It was forbidden to speak about VNs and decryptment outside our workrooms. And within the workrooms only with people one knew, hence not

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with unknown officers and officials, se-called visitors, who came into the Ministry under some pretext or other. Every serious cryptenalyst knows the consequences of the publication of a VN. When after the World War Ambessador PAGE published the so-called "Zimmerrann dispatches", in which Secretary of State von ZIMMERHANN tried to induce Mexico to enter the war against the USA, Chi made use of these publications to prove how important an exact decrypiment is and how important it is that every cryptographic system be carefully tested hefere it is put into use. And PAGE's publication was worth more than a whole course of first class lectures: Once when an English correspondent got knowledge in the Foreign Office of an Italian VN which had been decrypted at Chi and published it in a Manchester newspaper, including a cryptographic error which had slipped by Chi, this Italian diplomatic cipher was replaced and so, as far as I recall, was Andaesador AMADORI who was then stationed in Rige! In general it was considered a rule that the interests of truth can only be served by the publication of all sources 25 years after a significant event at the carliest. Before that it may be very intriguing but so many decost people, who have erred not from svil intent but only from human insufficiency, become involved hy such a publication that it is better to keep silent and wait. (For this reason, for instance, there is still no absolutely exact account of certain events of the First World War.) When the French Intelligence Service discovered that the French diplomatic systems were being worked on with ouccess at Chi, this information alone was enough to cause the Quai d' Orsay to replace certain systems more speedily than had previously heen the custom. Thus not only any publication but de facto any rumor constitutes a denger for the cryptanelytic unit, the purpose of which is not to satisfy comeone's docire for sensation but to promote the security of the country which one serves by reans which one prefere to emproy when dynamite and hicwtorches would attract too much attention without doing the slightest good.

25. Describe the training which should be given to a cryptanalyst. What are the basic requirements for a good cryptanalyst?

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Regarding the advisability, indeed the necessity of a training program

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for cryptonalysts, there could be no argument on the basis of the experience I had early in the 20's (when I took charge of the cryptanalytic section). Concepts which occur frequently in cryptology had not been defined at all or not definitively. Consequently misunferstandings were found in guite meaningless conferences. A set of instructions written at that time by the then First Lieutenant BUSCHENHAGER⁵³ with the collaboration of his employses⁵⁴ did describe the solution of several cryptographic systems but it made the error of always starting with the assumption that the character of the system was already known. Hence the technique of the spacial course of solution was perhaps correctly presented, but the question: "How do I solve an unknown system?", was touched on only fleatingly and therefore ensuered only incdequately. Cryptanalysis was carried on in a purely empirical manner; the guiding and consoling iden was: "Something sensible will occur to me." No one had as yet thought of the possibility of establishing none systematic order among the very varied systems already known. Particular names had been given to individual systems, it is true, but the essential connection between them was not yet recognized. In view of the conservative attitude of the old cryptanalysts and of their prejudices against every intovation, the attempt to bring order into the official vocabulary encountered difficulties. I therefore resolved to set up some practice problems which would depart from the usual. scheme only in very minor details and had the satisfaction of seeing that even the most gifted cryptanalyst did not find the correct solution. This circumstance was considered sufficient proof of the inadequacy of the method hitherto

^{53.} Oborlt. BUSCHENHAGEN was the founder and first director of the post World War I Cryptologic Bureau January 1920. He was later officer of the General Staff with various assignments; with the defection of Rour Pell into Russian captivity as General of Infentry.

^{54.} Eleven persons are listed elsewhere by FENNER as members of Chi in 1922: Hellmuth MUELLER (for France); Nikolai ROHEN and Carl WAECHTER (for England); Emil Freiherr von REZNICEK (for Italy); Alfred FUCHS (clerk); Peter NOVOPASCHENNY, Wilhelm FENNER, Alfonso KLEIBERT, First Lt. SCHMIDT, Feliz SCHERKE and Edith von BUECHTER (for Bussia). (DF 187).

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used of trial and error supported by experience. A few other problems with every resolutions now awakened interest in a new direction. In little talks in a very limited circle I presented first the general obsracteristics of the systematic arrangement of cryptographic systems and then the methodical solution of basic systems which had long since been known, that is to say, these cryptograms which are derived from the plain text by a single operation. In the oryptanelytic reports, which in these days were still prepared monthly, I unsparingly corrected everything which did not agree with the new tervinology, everything which was obscure and every devistion, no matter how slight, from a logical presentation. I weeded out all verbosity, every attempt to get around a clear presentation and to give an explanation in general terms. I called for a simple and naive description so that "even your superior can understand your cryptanalytic report". I accepted internal frictions because they proved to me that a critical epirit had taken hold. I did not expect any more as n beginning. However, I did forhid giving new employees general instructions for the solution of cryptographic systems and instead reserved to mysel? the right to start the new generation on the path which I had recognized as correct. So the new points of view gradually came to be accepted and in a few years were the general property of the oryptanalysts. However, there was still another diesdynntage about the older cryptanalysts which was disturbing: a man may be an excellent cryptanalyst; he works for months, sometimes far over a year, on one or two current systems. If they are solved, others take their place which generally are not essentially different from the old systems, especially in the case of plain codes: the virtually identical vocabulary has morely been distributed differently! The activity of such cryptanalysis unfailingly led to a one-sidedness it is a "then helpless as soon as a new system appeared which fell outside the framework of the familiar scheme. So about the middle of the 20's I collected the older cryptanelysts for a course of 90 days each working day except Saturday - and taught them the systematic classification of cryptographic systems, all hasic systems, systems showing a single combination, and the universally used forms of reencipherment. In contrast to the traditional presentation I started in each individual case with the general subject, in

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order to grevent the pupil from basing his conception on the special case. When in my examples I gars special cases and asked for a critical statement which alard at recognizing as quickly as possible every systematic feature contained in the eystem and of utilizing this knowledge skillfully, at checking how and when this systematic feature was recognized, indicating the "Locus mimoris registentine" and finally criticizing the system itself. My endwavor was at the same time to cause cryptology to rise from the sphere of a lower ("Kucde") - compare the common term "Wetterkunde" in Germany - to the higher level of a science (Hissenschaft). But precisely for this reason I had to refuse to give deal-sure recipes for the solution of this or that aryptographic system, that is, so to speak, a cooktook of cryptology! I taught the methods; the application I left to the judgment, but not to the whin, of the cryptenalysts. Although I had in my teaching the secondary purpose of giving the pupile a certain routice training, nevertheless the real main objective was to train them for research and for independent thinking and decision. Hence the following sequence of ideas and concepts was taken as a guide:

Meaning of the Instruction: Scientific Research Work Purpose of the Instruction: Training of Corporations Making Enown the Results of Previous Investigations Gathering of the Results of New Investigations Comparison of the Old and New Results (Criticism) Arrangement according to Certain Points of View (Rule, Systematic Classification) Aids, Sequence of Steps, Statistics (Nethod)

Picking out Regularities (Scientific Recognition) That the pupils within the limits set by this plan also became acquainted with specific aids, e. g., letter frequencies of foreign languages, frequencies of syllables, frequences another, goes without saying. I also considered it appropriate to introduce mathematics into the subject matter sverywhere where numbers could serve as a measure. The basic rules of combinatorial analysis (Kombinatorik) and of prohability had to be mastered. However, the results of such a training, even though far from comprehensive, were unmistakable: the frequency count of a

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persued the object of advancing only really capable people and not burdening acybody with menual bullant which he would not need as a statistical clerk or crypteralytic assistant. As I have already ventioned, I did not accept any beginners in this course, but did demand expressly that every beginner destined to become a cryptenalyst should as his first job make a count of a plain cone, then decode using a wall solved code, then halp on a code already in course of solution, and only then try his head on the independent solution of a code. Of course there were cases where I departed from this rule. This happened wher I had convinced myself of the trustability of a new appointee, of his inegitation, his knowledge of current events and his linguistic browledge. (I did not admit may applicant without subjecting him to a test. I had him give me a cample of his handwriting, asked about his favorite subject in school; put questions to him in the field with which he was least acquainted, not to werry him but is order to be able to judge from the reaction to my questions how he would used unpleasant situations. I also inquired about his views on natters which were occupying the mind of the general public; questioned him regarding his relations to God; tested his powert of imagination and only at the end had him well me all about his fevorite subject in order to get an idea of his vocabulery and his temperament. Independently of that the applicant had to wonslate into German orally an editorial from some foreign paper and make a written translander from German into that foreign language which he supposedly knew best. If on the basis of my total judgment I had become convinced that the applicant was a personality with adequate knowledge, then and only then did I request that he be hired). This method of selection and of initial occupation proved satisfactory and I did not have to give it up until I was forced during the war to accept replace (eddosmer (without examination, just as they were assigned me by the Labor Office through the Administrative Branch. Since the teaching would have been too burdensome for me alone I later had WENDLAND and HUETTENHAIN help me. The lawter was also told (during the war) to give lectures from the field of higher cryptclogy to those cryptanalysis who were considered best, 1. e., to those who seemed

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sufficience and realy is respect to language but also as analysts; he was to talk also on the theory of groups and the solution of systems with complex reencipherment, to take up the problem of modern machines, i. e., everything which experience had shown would go beyond the normal ability of a practical cryptenalyst. The idee of instituting such a course sprang from the fact that during the var a number of exceedingly capable analysts were working for ne who would raturn to their civil occupation efter the end of the war. However, the cryptologic ideas of these zen ought to be firzly anchored in Chi. Reports and kong papers would have dissipated the working strength of these analysis who were mostly mathematicians at universities. Consequently I deemed the use of lectures and mutual discussion and practice problems after the manner of the university seminar to be the most suitable method. From then on a difference was likewise made between "lower cryptology" and "higher cryptology" whereby the material taught by HUETTERFAIN belonged to the higher group as I mentioned a few lines back. On the besis of my experience I can merely say that these. courses in general, 1. s., Lover cryptology and those is higher cryptology, proved their worth. The uniformity of expression, the abundance of material offered, the selection of suitable exercises, and the constantly injected repetition of already known topics, not merely enriched the pupils' knowledge and deepened their understanding, but allowed then to ripen into men from whose mental fruits a good harvest was to be effected. Due to lack of space (one of my buildings had been completely destroyed in November 1943 by air attacks on Berlin), I had to discontinue my instruction. HURTTENHAIN was still giving lectures in the winter 44/45 until conditions in the building made even this instruction impossible,

The guiding principle of all the instruction can be superior in the following words: "A cryptographic system is a regular deviation from the forms of expression of the written language; recognition of this regularity is the break into the system; the mastery of this regularity is its solution." These words embrace the entire problem of the concept "cryptographic system" and likewise the task imposed upon the cryptanalyst. This is the world of his hypotheses and their collapse, of his hopes and his disappointments, of his probabilities

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and of his bungling, but also of his certainties and of his art. For in spite of all factual discoveries there remains in every genuine cryptanalyst as the imponderable of his performance the "divice spark".

It must be accepted as a fact, one which may perhaps be disturbing to other peoples, that the assuring of his own existence dominates the spiritual attitude of the German to a not unessential degree. This is not the place to inquire into the causes and reasons for this attitude. The idea of serving the state all one's life is not to be separated from the idea that this state recognizes the obligation to look out for its servant when he has become old and unable to work. And the state has not tried to avoid this obligation.⁵⁵ Instead it has recognized in a decision of the Imperial High Court of Justice that the pension is morely a part of the withheld salary. If this is the norm, then it is not strange if the employee as servant of the state in the form of an old age pension. In the Cryptologic Bureau the cryptanalyst was an employee (<u>Angestelltor</u>). Germany had no budgetary provision for this type of servant. Nevertheless this servant

55. The ensuing remarks should be read in connection with the following section taken from the official history of the Cryptologic Agency (probably written by FENNER) issued as DF 202: "I. Careers for Cryptanalysts:

In contrast to other countries, where an officer capable of cryptanalytic work could be active and could be promoted in this service, the German officer did not know and does not know even today of any such career. However, it had long been known that the cryptanalyst can offer a guarantee of steady performance only if he is placed in surroundings which favor his productive activity, independent of his inpate qualifications. METTERNICH had endeavored to make this clear to his imperial master in a memorandum. Offering pecuniary advantages did not tally with the German conception of State service. When in 1927 the first cryptanelyst was made an official (Beamter), a development was initiated which led after long, careful preliminary work and well-planned collaboration with the administration and competent civil authorities to a 'Decree Respecting the Training and Teeting for the Superior Foreign Language Service of the Armed Forces' approved by General Field Marshal KEITEL in 1939. This decree at last gave the academically trained cryptanalyst firm ground under his fest. If it freed the dulappointed cryptanalyst from uncertainty regarding his -----future, it also bound him as a superior official (hosherer Beamter) closely to the national government and raised him at the same time above the numberless interpreters and translators, to whom this career remained blocked. In spite of the high demands made in all seriousness and after mature deliberation on the applicants, this decree is in a real respect the highest recognition to date of cryptanalysis".

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of the state in his daily life came into contact with officers and officials who were "pensionable" simply because they followed a traditional path. This was feit as un undue hardship, as an injustice which was not simply due to fate. Buck in the mid-twenties some of the older cryptannlysts asked the then Director of the Cryptologic Bureau, First Lieutenant BUSCHENHAGEN, to make inquiry in competent quarters as to the circumstances under which it would be possible for the cryptanalysts to be taken over into the status of officials. The efforts of these men to get official status also had another reason. The cryptanalyst say that the officer or official who was discharged for reasons of economy found doors of opportunity open in the economic world because his activity had not necessarily been one-sided. The man working in cryptanalysis feared, however, that in case of dismissal he might become the victim of his one-sided mental activity. This fear was not unfounded. Even METTERNICE in a memorandum to his importal master had called to his attention the lot of his aged cryptanolysts, basing his plee on the fact that these servants of the state, who in their way were most discreet and faithful, would necessarily get into serious financial struits without a pension after a life which afforded little in the way of outward honors because their calling made it difficult for them to secure for themselves in old age any equivalent new position. In BUSCHENHAGEN's time, however, negotiations with the Ministry of Finance had no prospect of success. In 1927 I, as the constant pole of the cryptanalytic unit, became an official (Beamter) by exception; this was done to bind me permanently to the unit where the military directors changed every three or four years in any event, that is to say, just when they began to master the subject. Then for years nothing more happened ustil the founding of the Forschungsamt and the elevation of those employees who had left the Cryptologic Bureau to the rank of Pruseian officials finally vaked up the responsible officers in the Ministry of Defense and they proposed to the Ministry of Financs regular budgetary provisions for several officials and these were approved by him. Even though from a personal point of view no one could begrudge the elder cryptanalysts their promotion to Government

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Councillors (Regierungsreate), neverthelees this measure did not by any means signify a basic solution of the problem of creating official positions for cryptenalysts in the rigular table of organization. On the other hand, my unit was growing. Among the younger generation of cryptenalysts were a number of young university men who had already paged the first, and is some cusse even the second State Examination but had not been appointed as teachers because the supply was greater than the demand. Furthernors nost of then were not Party members, - consequently they would have had to sacrifice their political convictions to gain employment as teachers. In the Foreign Office conditione ware similar: only the Director of the Cryptologic Bureau was an official; his aryptanalysts were exployees. It is no wender that there gentlemen could no longer conceal their concern about old age when several of my gentlemen were raised to the status of officials. The unmistakable preferential treatment of these cryptenalysts who had goue from the Cryptologic Bureau to GOERING's Forschungsamt esemed like a mockery: fidelity and loyalty to the Mehrmacht was in a vey being peralized; In the matter of social position, which was so important even in the "Dritts Roich" the cryptanalysts around COERING had therefore won their race. That not usrely had an effect is small. matters, e. g., in conferences with business firms, the respect with which the Cryptologic Eureau was regarded was in danger of being lost unless its cryptanalysts were given firm ground to stand on. Then late is the 30'e I sas instructed to draw up regulations for a career as upper grade official (hoshere Beante) in cryptenelysis. I had thought about the matter often enough already so that the task fiself was not new to me. Of course, I had to keep in mind that such a career, as career of a government official (Reichsbeamte) must be stated in such general terms that it would be valid for the Foreign Office and even for the Forschungsent as well. The draft was worked over many times, naturally enough. For not only the Army administration was heard and consulted but also the Foreign Office and the Ministry of the Interior, the Minister of Finance, of course, and possibly even the Fornchungeart itself, which generally paid little attention to matters of government

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regulations. However, the Administrative Office of the <u>Wehrmacht</u> pushed the matter all the more vigorously. Well over a year passed before the career regulations came back into my hands with KETTEL's signature, approved as in the draft. But with that an almost twenty-year-old struggle was ended and we had firm ground under our feet.

The most important points in the career regulations were:

- Creation of the officials of the "Superior Foreign Language Service of the Armed Forces."
- Applicants. Basically eligible are only university trained men who have the doctorate or have passed the first major State Examination.

Admitted are: philologists, jurists, mathematicians and natural scientists with full mastery of one foreign language and a good knowledge of a second foreign language. Mathematicians need show a knowledge of only one foreign language. As a normal requirement a clean record was demanded, and in the case of applicants who wished to enter the <u>Wehrmacht</u> physical fitness and, if possible, evidence that they had completed their period of servics in the Army. Before being accepted the applicant had to submit to an examination in which he was to prove his linguistic knowledge or his mathematical knowledge. If the results of the scamination were favorable, he was given a provisional appointment as regular or supernumerary <u>Regierungsassessor</u> (according to whether a position was vacant or not). (The type of examination corresponded to the one I have described above).

3. <u>Training</u>. Assignment of tasks was as in the case of any beginner but with the difference that the section head, to whom an "<u>Assessor</u>" was assigned for training, was to present every three monthe a report on the <u>self</u> was to keep a record of his activities and present it monthly. The applicant must have attended the course in lower cryptology with demonstrable success (two years). After the expiration of three years (total time) at the earliest, the applicant might apply for admission to the second major state examination with the purpose of being accepted as lifelong official of the

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Superior Foreign Language Service of the Armed Forces (- cryptanalyst). Admission to the examination was only granted as a matter of principle if the appropriate section head and the director of the cryptanalytic unit were of the opinion that the examinee had mastered the material and was sufficiently mature. (To the regular training of the applicant belonged also lectures on the Civil Service Law, Organization of the <u>Wehrmacht</u>, Patent Law and Disciplinary Law).

4. Examination. First day: Translation into German of some 20 lines of a foreign article on cryptography or cryptology (written). Examination of a simple cryptographic system, e. g., of a linear slide or disc system or some similar gadget. Solution of a basic system by analysis with a criticiam. (Instead of this assignment mathematicians were given a problem from cryptologic mathematics). Time: 6 hours.

Second day: Approximately 20 minutes devoted to a test on law, then about 50 minutes on cryptography and cryptology. Not more than three examinees at the same time.

5. <u>Examining Commission</u>. The Chief of the Cryptologic Bureau, the Director of the cryptanalytic unit and one of the teachers who had participated in the training, and a representative of the Administrative Office of the Webrwacht.

6. <u>Results of the examinations</u>. The Commission rated the performances according to nine grades from "Deficient", to "Laudable". Since none of the candidates desired to become administrative officials with legal duties, in the rating one point was added to the rating in law before the average was taken. If two candidates had equally good ratings the preference was given to the one whose bearing during the examination was better and who was con- $-t^2 = -2 + r^{1/2} - the$ higher character.

7. If a candidate <u>did not pass the examination</u>, he was given the option of repeating the examination in a year. A third examination was forbidden.

8. Applicants who <u>passed the examination</u> were appointed Government Councillor (<u>Regierungerat</u>) and received corresponding salaries and secured the right to the old age pension and provision for vidows established by law. The officials were permitted as officials of the <u>Wehrmacht</u> to year the uniform of

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the branch of the service selected and took the prescribed oath of office.

A further provision took account of the circumstance that there was as yet no experience to show whether the requirements covered in the examination could be mat in the prescribed time. Therefore amendments were to be possible and were to be worked out in agreement with the examining commission and the agencies involved, e. g., elimination of certain jurietic questions, extension of the time for solving the cryptologic problem. The intention was to avoid a rigid scheme which would not correspond to the actual demands of the profession. There was further provision that only these officiale should be nllowed to wear a uniform who had fulfilled their obligation to serve in the <u>Wehrmacht</u> in order to avoid having an official who was regarded by the people as an officer - only an expert could distinguish an officer's uniform from an official's uniform - giving occasion for adverse criticism.

In my opinion the career regulations had a beneficial effect. Order was secured and there was a clear understanding as to who had a legal cluim to become an official and who did not. Wild claims could no longer be made which were based on the more or less subjective impression of a man who was trying to represent the unfairness of his superiors as the sole cause of his personal failure. And those officials who were appointed or promoted after having passed an examination had the moral estisfaction of not having become officials due to some dubious favor but after honest proof of their ability by satisfying recognized requirements.

The examination was by no means "pro forma" but demanded proof of actual knowledge of the subject and a knowledge which could be turned to account at any time. Both parties, the examiner acd the examinee, were expected to show great new from the preparation of the various examinations took weeks of effort since, deepite the difference in their appearance and content, they all had to be approximately equal in difficulty. The conscientious observance of all regulations and prescribed authority called for an exact acquaintance with the subject and the actual responsibility lay neverthelees on the shouldere of the head of the cryptanalytic section, which, however, was a matter of course in view of the importance of the examination.

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